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Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) is considered as 
a standard for enterprise software development. The 
main characteristics of SOA are dynamic discovery 
and composition of software services in a heteroge-
neous environment. These properties pose newer chal-
lenges in fault management of SOA-based systems 
(SBS). A proper understanding of different faults in an 
SBS is very necessary for effective fault handling. A 
comprehensive three-fold fault taxonomy is presented 
here that covers distributed, SOA specific and non-
functional faults in a holistic manner. A comprehensive 
fault taxonomy is a key starting point for providing 
techniques and methods for accessing the quality of a 
given system. In this paper, an attempt has been made 
to outline several SBSs faults into a well-structured 
taxonomy that may assist developers in planing suit-
able fault repairing strategies. Some commonly em-
phasized fault recovery strategies are also discussed. 
Some challenges that may occur during fault handling 
of SBSs are also mentioned.
ACM CCS (2012) Classification: Applied computing 
→ Enterprise computing → Service-oriented archi-
tectures
Information systems → World Wide Web → Web ser-
vices
Software and its engineering → Software organiza-
tion and properties → Extra-functional properties → 
Software fault tolerance
Keywords: fault, SOA-based System (SBS), Service 
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1. Introduction
SOA (Service-Oriented Architecture) is a pop-
ular distributed design paradigm that provides 
architectural style to enable applications to be 
built using service as a key element. The sys-
tem developed using the concept of SOA is 
known as SOA-based System (SBS). The main 
property of SOA is to dynamically discover ser-
vices from different service providers and their 
composition at runtime in order to construct the 
software system. This transparency makes the 
SOA effective but also brings the possibility of 
various faults to occur at different stages.
In technological terms, a fault is an abnormal 
condition of the system (or in a component, 
equipment, or sub-system) which may lead to a 
failure. In other words, a fault is a problem that 
occurs when a service invocation made by an 
SBS results in some abnormal behavior at run-
time [1]. IEEE [2] defines more precisely a soft-
ware fault as an incorrect step, process or data 
definition in a computer program. The error is a 
human action that generates an incorrect result. 
Failure is the inability of a system or compo-
nent to accomplish its required functions within 
specified performance requirements. The faults 
can easily escape the attention and increase in 
their severity. If a fault is not handled properly, 
then it increases the system failure rate. Detect-
ing a faulty service is a very difficult task. The 
fault can only be detected in the execution step 
when the service is actually executed. The fault 
analysis process takes fault data as input and 
determines a suitable remedial strategy for the 
fault instance [3].
SBS must be capable to manage faults, i.e. a 
system can detect a fault and its root cause and 
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recover it from fault situation. A fault leads to a 
failure when the system does not perform up to 
the specifications and shows the behavior that is 
a visible deviation from the expected behavior 
of the system. So, immediate recovery action is 
needed to handle the fault and to keep the sys-
tem free from failure to increase its dependabil-
ity. Correct execution of its functions without 
any interruptions ensures the dependability of 
a system. To increase the dependability of the 
SBS, a fault management should be performed 
that covers the following basic operations: 1) 
detection of faults in SBS by identifying the 
location of the fault, 2) diagnosis of the fault; 
the root cause of the fault is identified and, 
finally 3) recovery from the fault situation, ap-
plying appropriate recovery strategy and back 
to its smooth functioning. 
A taxonomy is a practicable idea for under-
standing similarities and differences of the 
methods and techniques based on their char-
acteristics. The main contribution of this paper 
is a fault taxonomy of SBS. The attributes of 
a fault can be classified including its severity, 
failure type, time of failure occurrence and the 
type of fault. Different aspects of faults in SBS 
have been studied and outlined in three cate-
gories as SOA life cycle-specific faults, distrib-
uted system faults, and non-functional faults. 
Some commonly emphasized fault recovery 
strategies are also discussed. Some challenges 
that may occur during fault handling of SBSs 
are also mentioned.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 discusses related work. Section 3 
briefly introduces Service Oriented Architec-
ture (SOA). Some faults in SBS, observed in 
the literature, are summarized in Section 4. The 
proposed extended fault taxonomy of SBS and 
a brief explanation of every identified fault are 
mentioned in Section 5 and the following sub-
sections. In Section 6, some commonly adopted 
fault recovery strategies for SBS have been 
discussed. Section 7 points out some SBS fault 
handling challenges. Finally, Section 8 summa-
rizes the work with the concluding remarks.
2. Related Work
In the literature, most of the taxonomies have 
underlined the general software faults. Some 
efforts are centered on distributed system and 
Component-based System (CBS). Very few re-
search efforts are available related to fault tax-
onomy of SOA based system (SBS). A study of 
Stefan et al. [4] is very close to our work. They 
have categorized SOA fault taxonomy into five 
types such as publishing fault, discovery fault, 
composition fault, binding fault and execution 
fault corresponding to SOA life cycle stages. 
Their presentation of fault taxonomy of SOA is 
unaware of the interactions among the faults. 
They have presented a well-defined collection 
of SOA related faults, nevertheless they have 
weakly mentioned how a fault propagates to 
another fault. Cheun et al. [5] have defined 
fault taxonomy by extracting all target elements 
and inter-relationships among the elements for 
service fault management and presented proto-
type implementation using cause taxonomy and 
checked its validity experimentally. 
Avizienis et al. [6] presented a comprehensive 
paper on taxonomy of the dependable and se-
cure computing. Mariani [7] has proposed a 
fault taxonomy related to the component-based 
systems along with the brief explanation of 
the causes and consequences of faults. In his 
approach, faults are categorized as syntactic 
faults, semantics faults, non-functional faults, 
connectors faults, topology faults, and other 
faults. There are some differences between 
CBS and web services. Web services execute 
remotely, whereas components are mostly 
downloaded to execute locally on the client and 
they have to deal with considerable heteroge-
neity in platforms middleware. Hummer et al. 
[8] have also used well-established fault dimen-
sions proposed by Avizienis et al. [6], to elabo-
rate a fault taxonomy for Event-based Systems 
(EBS) by discussing fault instances across the 
five sub-areas of event processing. Chan et al. 
[9] have presented a fault taxonomy based upon 
[10] for web service composition that covers 
physical faults, development faults, and inter-
action faults.
Fault taxonomy, classifying only security faults 
of software with its application is presented by 
Aslam et al. [11]. They have categorized secu-
rity faults as synchronization errors, condition 
validation errors, configuration errors and en-
vironment faults. Their classification scheme 
is helpful in the understanding of computer se-
curity faults that cause security breaches. Vija-
3.1. SOA Life Cycle
Following are the different stages of SOA life 
cycle.
Publishing. service providers construct ser-
vices on the network and provide their corre-
sponding service descriptions. All web services 
are described by WSDL (Web Service Descrip-
tion Language) documents.
Discovery. if a service consumer needs an ap-
propriate service to perform a certain task, then 
he has to discover a corresponding service 
among all the service providers. A comparison 
between a required service and a service in the 
repository can be made, based on the search cri-
teria, to discover the suitable one.
Composition. if there is no such an identi-
cal service discovered in the service deposi-
tory then there is still another possible option 
to compose two or more services to fulfill the 
service consumer's requirement. Two or more 
services can dynamically be composed at run-
time, either by the service choreography or ser-
vice orchestration.
Binding. at this stage, desired service execution 
permission is granted to the service consumer 
after applying authentication, authorization, 
and accounting. If a service is bound to the con-
sumer system, then it can be used to fulfill the 
requirement. SLA (Service Level Agreement) 
describes the details of the agreement between 
service consumer and service broker. 
Execution. if the service is successfully bound 
to a consumer, service(s) can be executed. All 
the input parameters are transferred to the ser-
vice provider system and output parameters are 
returned to the consumer.
yaraghavan et al. [12] have presented bug tax-
onomies with some bugs and challenges in the 
real software environment examples. Kidwell 
et al. [13] have mentioned that fault classifi-
cation provides vital information for software 
analytics and that machine learning techniques 
like clustering can be applied to learn a pro-
ject-specific fault taxonomy.
From the above literature review, it can be ob-
served that several efforts are available regard-
ing the fault taxonomy, but there are limited ef-
forts available regarding fault taxonomy of SOA 
based systems. We extend the above contribu-
tions further by presenting a fault taxonomy, 
especially meant for SBS, that covers distrib-
uted, SOA specific and non-functional aspects 
together. The proposed taxonomy tries to collo-
cate possible faults of SBSs in well-structured 
classification on the basis of their severity, 
types and time of occurrence.
3. Service Oriented Architecture
According to IBM definition [14], "SOA" 
(Service Oriented Architecture) is a set of ar-
chitectural principles, patterns, and criteria, 
that address characteristics such as modularity, 
encapsulation, loose coupling, separation of 
concerns, reuse and composability. Microsoft 
defines it as "a loosely-coupled architecture de-
signed to meet the business needs of the orga-
nization" [15]. Mainly there are three parties in 
the SOA-based System (SBS). These are service 
provider, service broker (or service repository 
or service registry) and service consumer. The 
service provider constructs a service or a set of 
services and registers them into service repos-
itory. The service provider creates a web ser-
vice and deploys it into the service repository. 
Service broker makes the information of the 
available web service to the service consumer. 
Service requester or service consumer demands 
for a service or a set of services according to the 
need. Service providers and service consumers 
are loosely coupled. They communicate with 
each other through a service broker. A service 
provider can also be a service consumer. Figure 
1 illustrates a basic SOA interaction structure. 
In further subsection, SOA life cycle steps are 
briefly described.
Figure 1. SOA interaction structure.
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4. Some Observed Faults in SOA 
Based Systems
In this section, some of the observable SBS 
faults, available in the literature are presented. 
Basically, a fault is a problem that results in 
some abnormality condition at runtime [1]. Ser-
vice faults can fall into one of the four catego-
ries: healthy, impacted, hidden and faulty [16]. 
From a temporal perspective, Huang et al. [16] 
have mentioned four parameters of a service 
si; service execution time E(si), accumulated 
execution time A(si), execution time threshold 
T(si), and intermediate deadline D(si). Among 
the four parameters, E(si) and A(si) are moni-
tored at runtime. Based on these four values, a 
service falls into one of the four categories: 
 ● Healthy: Formally, if and only if E(si) ≤ 
T(si) and A(si) ≤ D(si), which means it is in 
a good situation. Healthy service does not 
show any abnormal behavior at all, but if 
it depends on other faulty service or gen-
erates fault itself, then it can be faulty. It 
depends upon the nature of the fault and on 
what kind of behavior it possesses. 
 ● Impacted: if and only if E(si) ≤ T(si) and 
A(si) > D(si), which means si is not the root 
cause to originate fault, but its QoS is im-
pacted by other service say sj. If the work-
flow goes through the impacted region, the 
fault may be propagated to the system.
 ● Hidden: Hidden fault can be defined for-
mally as, if and only if E(si) > T(si) and 
A(si) ≤ D(si), which means it should be re-
configured to avoid any problem caused 
by inter-dependency. The hidden fault is 
problematic to identify and takes any re-
medial action for redemption.
 ● Faulty: Faulty service shows abnormal 
behavior at runtime. Formally, it can be 
defined as, if and only if E(si) > T(si) and 
A(si) > D(si), refers it is a root cause of the 
application-level violation.
In this review, we highlight the faulty cases in 
SBSs. There are so many reasons for the oc-
currence of faults in SOA. Service mismatch is 
one of the major causes of the fault. A service 
mismatch occurs during development time, if 
not corrected, creates fault at runtime. Service 
mismatch is the problem that may occur when 
a service does not fully match the feature ex-
pected. If a fault is active, then it generates an 
error. Fault can be either initiated by external 
interaction or by internal dormant fault [6]. If 
error propagates in an SBS, then it causes fail-
ure, of the system resulting in incorrect service. 
The creation of fault and its propagation is 
shown in Figure 2.
A byzantine fault is a SBS fault highly em-
phasized by the researchers, it presents differ-
ent symptoms to different observers. A system 
can lose the execution due to byzantine failure 
which is created by root cause of a byzantine 
fault. Zhao et al. [17] have proposed a frame-
work for byzantine failure tolerance messaging 
framework (BTF-WS) which is based on Cas-
tro and Liskov's BFT algorithm to maximize the 
interoperability. This framework has a draw-
back as it needs high cost in terms of processing 
power because every client request effectively 
processes twice to maintain the replicas for the 
security purpose.
Wang et al. [3] have categorized fault types on 
the basis of four contexts such as: functional 
context, QoS context, domain context and plat-
form context. Belli et al. [18] have shown fault 
taxonomy on the basis of sequencing pattern of 
the graph-based approach; positive sequencing 
faults, negative sequencing faults. Balbastro 
et al. [19] have focused on the error during ser-
vice delivery as a latent error and dormant fault. 
Zhai et al. [20] have classified SOA faults on 
the basis of stages of SOA life cycle.
Friedrich et al. [21] have discussed permanent 
fault and transient fault. The permanent fault 
occurs due to the faulty operation and may re-
sult in faulty behavior. There may be a transient 
fault or a temporary fault, although the subse-
quent operations of this operation are correct. 
Jinfu et al. [22] have identified three types of 
faults; 1) interaction faults of several parame-
ters of the same service, 2) interaction faults of 
parameters for different services and 3) vulner-
ability faults. Through effective testing, one can 
find the interaction fault [23][22][24] between 
parameters of the same service or inter-service 
fault between two services. 
Ye et al. [23] have categorized faults into two 
major types: type 1 relates to the internal fault 
to a service and type 2 corresponds to inconsis-
tency faults that cut across different services in 
a service composition. Different faulty versions 
of service compositions can be obtained by 
seeding one fault to every original service com-
positions using mutation testing techniques. 
Each faulty version has one mutation.
In Table 1, we summarize different types of 
fault in SBS observed in the literature. The 
Figure 2. Propagation model of fault, error and failure.
Table 1.  Fault types, fault tolerant systems and assumptions.
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Figure 2. Propagation model of fault, error and failure.
Table 1.  Fault types, fault tolerant systems and assumptions.







tions, reading and writing 
files, and accessing criti-
cal memory regions.
–  History based approach to analyzing whether 
prescribed policies are violated or not.
–  Long-lived transactions can hold locks on 








from a flat transaction, 
transactions with save-
points, nested transactions
–  A mechanism for handling exceptions in a 
synchronized way
–  FT (Fault Tree) technique for providing cor-






–  Temporal unavailability 
of service = Estimated 
execution time < end 
available time
–  Temporal service un-
availability
–  Analysis impact region and applying repair 
strategies: replacement, re-composition, and 
renegotiation
–  Calculates temporal negative impact, in-
consistent and satisfied OR consistent and 
unsatisfied OR inconsistent and unsatisfied.
Byzantine fault 






Byzantine fault: Different 
symptoms to different 
observers.
–  To achieve maximum interoperability
–  Implementation in Standard SOAP messag-
ing framework
–  On a testbed consisting of 20 Dell SC440 








Availability of network 
and nodes congestion, 
transmission errors and 
delays
–  Result: identify constraint violations, in-
crease the probability of exhibiting network 
traffic related faults.
–  Uses UML 2.0 model based on analysis of 
control flow in sequence diagrams
Timeout 
exception [29] Formal approach
WS-CDL and WS-BPEL 
supportive exception 
handling
–  Interaction failures
–  Timeout errors
–  Validation errors
–  In case of deadline overrun, the event handler 
will take over and halt the process.
–  Using a document ordering and delivery 
process 
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data in the table are organized in the following 
manner. Firstly, we mention the types of fault, 
their corresponding fault tolerance approach, 
the possible reason for that particular fault and 
finally some special remarks. We try to cover 
various faults that may occur in an SBS.
5. The Proposed Extended Fault  
Taxonomy of SOA-based System
The proposed fault taxonomy is based on the 
[3], [4], [39], [30], [18] and [9]. We have cat-
egorized SBSs fault into three classes in our 
proposed fault taxonomy of SBS: SOA cy-
cle-specific fault, distributed system related 
faults and non-functional faults. The proposed 
classification scheme can assist in the proper 
understanding of faults that results in security 
breaches by categorizing faults and grouping 
faults that share mutual characteristics. Faults 
may overlap each other as one fault may be-
come the cause of another fault.
SOA life cycle has 5 major steps (as mentioned 
in Section 3). Each step corresponds to unique 
faults; publishing fault, discovery fault, compo-
sition fault, binding fault, and execution fault. 
The categorization of SOA specific faults is 
motivated by the fault taxonomy of Brüning 
[4]. However, their taxonomy fails to represent 
the cascading faults in the SBS. SBS belongs to 
the distributed system, thus we have made one 
class for distributed system faults that covers 
the hardware faults, software faults, communi-
cation errors, and user wrongs. All other faults 
dealing with non-functional properties are cat-
egorized into the third category called ‘non-
functional faults'. Figure 3 depicts the proposed 
fault taxonomy framework and Figure 4 dis-
plays the proposed fault taxonomy of SBS. In 
the following subsections, the proposed fault 
taxonomy has been explored.






Assume there is a 
network problem –  The transient fault causes unavailable service 




Customers making false 
or repetitive claims
–  Customer's malicious or aggressive Internet 
activities do not guarantee SLA claims and 
violate the AUP (Acceptable Use Policy)
–  False or repetitive claims are also a violation 
of SLA.










–  Faults related to archi-
tectural layering and 
context-based 
–  Unable to change ac-
cording to surrounding
–  Architecture choices must inform and be 
informed by validation and verification 
techniques 
–  Focus on different faults that are realized as 




A fuzzy mutation 
approach algo-
rithm
Interaction faults of pa-
rameters within services 
and inter-services; testing 
approach
–  Extract URL information of the Web services 
to obtain the interface information.
–  Testing involves injecting only one mutant at 
a time. 
–  Implemented in c#, the efficiency of the 








–  Time inconsistency and 
unsatisfactory condi-
tion. 
–  Change of service due 
to the service replace-
ment.
–  Find impact region, existing impact region 
and expand the impact region and increase 
the range if it does not produce robust and 
adaptive SBS.
–  Recover and handle the violation in rela-
tion to the strategy of minimizing the no. of 
service change.
Crash fault [35] Byzantine fault tolerance model
–  Crash faults and mali-
cious fault 
–  Crash fault due to 
hardware failure or 
malicious fault due to 
software malfunction
–  The server is replicated to 4 replicas to toler-
ate from fault replica. 
–  Optimistic replication technique is used.
–  Reduce 20% of the peak system throughput 





Failure in one node 
(service) depending on 
another service
–  Increasing the number of alternate services 
can significantly improve the network toler-
ance if each service has only few alternate 
services available.







Failures of system on-
time completion due to 
uncertain system perfor-
mance, failure of timely 
completion of workflow 
activities
–  Throughput consistency state verification 
–  Violation handling point selection
–  The mean time response time of workflow 
instances is 79.64 s, and mean response time 









Runtime unavailability of 
component services that 
results in composition 
failure.
–  Migrating the failed execution into a best al-
ternative execution of the composite service.
–  Computing the number of invisibly compen-
sated transitions is NP-complete.
–  The finite state machine to model the ap-
proach.
5.1. Distributed System Faults
SOA is a distributed system, so faults occur in 
a distributed system inherently occur in an SBS 
as well. Mariani [7] suggests a fault taxonomy 
that narrates distributed system faults, but their 
taxonomy is targeted for a component-based sys-
tem. Data corruption, hanging processes, mis-
leading return values. Misbehaving participating 
machines, hardware/software/network aging are 
the major causes generating a fault in SBS [40]. 
Intermittent Internet outages, outages caused by 
hardware (server/node) crashes and downtime 
due to the maintenance of hardware and soft-
ware upgrades and bug fixes may generate dis-
tributed system faults [40]. Moreover, resources 
exploitation, insufficient disk space during data 
reading and writing to the disk cause temporary 
failures of all involved computational jobs. We 
have sub-categorized distributed faults into four 
classes platform context fault, software fault, in-
teraction fault and human error/wrongs. Each of 
them is individually introduced as follows.
5.1.1. Platform Context Fault
Adaption faults, hardware or device related faults 
and connectivity related faults are acknowledged 
as platform context faults. Due to different plat-
forms and the environments, the new technol-
ogy cannot adapt to the emerging technology. 
Hardware change, and communication medium 
change bring the system into the unintended 
state. Since SBS is a platform independent sys-
tem, the manufactured hardware platform should 
cope with the software technology. We have in-
vestigated a few platform context faults related 
to SBS. Following subsections describe each of 
them briefly.
Adaption fault. Architecture choices must in-
form and be informed by validation and verifi-
cation techniques in order to mitigate the impact 
of adaptation faults and their associated failures. 
Different faults are realized as failures in higher 
layers. Faults tend to be detected in layers other 
than the ones in which they occur. Faults related 
to architectural layering and context-based 
system are called adaption faults. Adaptation 
faults are unable to change according to sur-
rounding environment-speed/location. Sama 
et al. [32] have discussed adaption faults and 
proposed Context-Aware Adaptive Applica-
tions (CAAAs) system as fault tolerant system.
Figure 3. A proposed extended fault taxonomy 
framework.
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data in the table are organized in the following 
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finally some special remarks. We try to cover 
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dealing with non-functional properties are cat-
egorized into the third category called ‘non-
functional faults'. Figure 3 depicts the proposed 
fault taxonomy framework and Figure 4 dis-
plays the proposed fault taxonomy of SBS. In 
the following subsections, the proposed fault 
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proach.
5.1. Distributed System Faults
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that narrates distributed system faults, but their 
taxonomy is targeted for a component-based sys-
tem. Data corruption, hanging processes, mis-
leading return values. Misbehaving participating 
machines, hardware/software/network aging are 
the major causes generating a fault in SBS [40]. 
Intermittent Internet outages, outages caused by 
hardware (server/node) crashes and downtime 
due to the maintenance of hardware and soft-
ware upgrades and bug fixes may generate dis-
tributed system faults [40]. Moreover, resources 
exploitation, insufficient disk space during data 
reading and writing to the disk cause temporary 
failures of all involved computational jobs. We 
have sub-categorized distributed faults into four 
classes platform context fault, software fault, in-
teraction fault and human error/wrongs. Each of 
them is individually introduced as follows.
5.1.1. Platform Context Fault
Adaption faults, hardware or device related faults 
and connectivity related faults are acknowledged 
as platform context faults. Due to different plat-
forms and the environments, the new technol-
ogy cannot adapt to the emerging technology. 
Hardware change, and communication medium 
change bring the system into the unintended 
state. Since SBS is a platform independent sys-
tem, the manufactured hardware platform should 
cope with the software technology. We have in-
vestigated a few platform context faults related 
to SBS. Following subsections describe each of 
them briefly.
Adaption fault. Architecture choices must in-
form and be informed by validation and verifi-
cation techniques in order to mitigate the impact 
of adaptation faults and their associated failures. 
Different faults are realized as failures in higher 
layers. Faults tend to be detected in layers other 
than the ones in which they occur. Faults related 
to architectural layering and context-based 
system are called adaption faults. Adaptation 
faults are unable to change according to sur-
rounding environment-speed/location. Sama 
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proposed Context-Aware Adaptive Applica-
tions (CAAAs) system as fault tolerant system.
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Device fault. Hardware components can be 
faulty at any stage of process execution. Hard-
ware glitches, power failure, and technical fail-
ure may occur in any component of the system 
that brings the distributed system failure. We 
have noticed three kinds of faults: service fault, 
client fault, and router fault as device fault or 
node fault. Faults in a particular node or com-
munication channel, transmission media, mem-
ory, processing units, storage media, surges and 
spikes of power supply are possibly observed 
device faults or crash faults. Hardware faults 
causing subsequent software faults are physical 
faults with their origin in the physical device 
[41].
Connectivity fault. Congestion, transmission 
errors, transmission delays are the connectivity 
related problems that cause unavailability of 
network and nodes. Garousi et al. [28] have im-
plemented prototype-DRTS (Distributed Real-
Time Systems), a prototype tool that uses UML 
2 .0 model based on the analysis of control flow 
in sequence diagrams. As a result, their tool is 
able to identify constraint violations and in-
creases the probability of exhibiting network 
traffic related faults. Liu et al. [30] have stated 
that transient fault may cause unavailability of 
service due to network problem in service-ori-
ented architecture.
5.1.2. Software Fault
In this category, we have presented mainly 
two types of faults, such as byzantine fault and 
malicious fault. The term byzantine fault was 
coined by Lamport to represent an arbitrary 
fault, which might be a crash fault due to hard-
ware failures or a malicious fault due to soft-
ware malfunction caused by an intrusion into 
the system. Byzantine fault often refers to ar-
bitrary fault and shows different symptoms to 
different observers. Byzantine fault tolerance 
refers to the capability of a system to provide 
correct services to its clients in the presence of 
byzantine faults. A study [42] by Chai et al. has 
proposed a byzantine fault tolerance approach 
using state-machine replication with byzan-
tine agreement algorithm. To ensure the SBS 
is secure against malicious attacks we need to 
analyze and understand the characteristics of 
faults that can subvert security mechanisms. 
Zhao et al. [17] have also developed byzantine 
fault-tolerance framework named BTF-WS to 
achieve maximum interoperability. They have 
implemented their BTF-WS in standard SOAP 
messaging framework and tested it on a testbed 
consisting of 20 Dell SC440 servers connected 
by a 100 Mbps Ethernet on SUSE Linux.
The malicious fault may occur due to software 
malfunction caused by an intrusion into the sys-
tem. Chai et al. [35] have also discussed byz-
antine fault (crash fault and malicious fault) 
and modeled byzantine fault tolerance system. 
Their byzantine fault tolerance mechanisms 
guarantee correctness of properties. The server 
is replicated to 4 replicas to tolerate from fault 
replica. The optimistic replication technique 
has been used. It reduces 20% of the peak sys-
tem throughput to keep 4 replicas.
5.1.3. Interaction Fault
URL (Unified Resource Locator) information of 
the Web services it used to obtain the interface 
information. It can parse WSDL documents to 
obtain the SOAP messages. Vulnerability faults 
cannot be detected if the testing involves inject-
ing only one mutant at a time. Chen et al. [22] 
have proposed a fuzzy mutation approach algo-
rithm to reduce the interaction faults/vulnera-
bility faults assuming that there are interaction 
faults of parameters within services and inter-
services. From the implementation in C#, 54% 
efficiency of the proposed system has been 
achieved. Failure in one node (service) may 
affect another service. Increasing the number 
of alternate services can significantly improve 
the network tolerance if each service has only 
a few alternate services available. Dependency 
which creates the failure of one service can 
cause the failure of another dependent service. 
Effect of network topology on tolerance is more 
significant on a lower degree of an alternative. 
Scale-free topology has generally the highest 
tolerance. Lhaksman et al. [36] have proposed 
cascading failure tolerance system to deal with 
cascading failure caused by service interaction. 
5.1.4. Human Error
Human error causes the service interruptions 
on the smooth execution of SBS and creates 
a problem on service delivery. Human error is 
Figure 4. A proposed extended fault taxonomy for SBS.
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information. It can parse WSDL documents to 
obtain the SOAP messages. Vulnerability faults 
cannot be detected if the testing involves inject-
ing only one mutant at a time. Chen et al. [22] 
have proposed a fuzzy mutation approach algo-
rithm to reduce the interaction faults/vulnera-
bility faults assuming that there are interaction 
faults of parameters within services and inter-
services. From the implementation in C#, 54% 
efficiency of the proposed system has been 
achieved. Failure in one node (service) may 
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difficult to model and prevent. Shwartz et al. 
[43] have noticed four human wrongs: request, 
time, configuration item and command wrongs. 
The user or the operator of the SBS may send 
the request with invalid input or logical error. In 
that case, the system cannot function properly. 
The user can send a request at an invalid time 
like ordering an item after a time-out. If the 
SBS system developer has not properly handled 
the exception of the system as many ways the 
system can be configured then the system may 
produce the invalid configuration result. A very 
common mistake by the user is an invalid com-
mand resulting from syntactical or symmetrical 
error in the command. 
5.2. SOA Cycle-specific Faults
SOA cycle-specific faults apply to SOA only. 
Some distributed system faults are also com-
mon with SOA cycle-specific faults because 
SOA is also a distributed design paradigm. We 
have also adopted some aspects of the fault tax-
onomy of Brüning et al. [4]. We try to include 
some additional SOA cycle-specific faults in 
addition to Brüning et al. taxonomy. There are 
five steps of SOA cycle: publishing, discov-
ering, composition, binding and execution, as 
mentioned in Section 3. We have categorized 
SOA cycle-specific faults into five categories 
as described in the following subsections.
5.2.1. Publishing Fault
The fault which occurs in the publishing stage 
of SBS is called publishing fault. Logical faults 
and policy violations are noticed as publishing 
fault in our proposed fault taxonomy of SBS. 
Bartole et al. [26] have discussed fault regard-
ing prescribed policy violation. They have also 
proposed a history-based approach to analyzing 
whether prescribed policies are violated or not. 
Their approach deals with security-relevant ac-
tivities, for example, opening socket problem, a 
problem on reading and writing files, and prob-
lem on accessing critical memory regions etc.
5.2.2. Discovering Fault
Service unavailability fault has gained more at-
tention from the researchers. Ismail et al. [27] 
and Wang et al. [24] have presented mathemat-
ical model about the temporal unavailability of 
services. They have stated that a service can 
be unavailable for certain period of time due 
to its maintenance, or some services may be 
available for only a certain time, for example, 
railways ticket booking service, movie theatre 
ticket booking service. Temporal unavailability 
of service can be calculated by estimating exe-
cution time and end available time.
5.2.3. Composition Fault
Service composition process may fail at inter-
mediate state due to an incomplete description 
of goal service requirements or due to the fact 
that the user is unaware or uninformed of the 
functionality provided by the existing partic-
ipant services [44] [45]. For example: if the 
"Online Booking" service is lacking all other 
committed services such as "Item Availability 
Check" the service should be roll-backed. Ser-
vice composition is the most fault-prone ac-
tivity in SBS since the task of the composition 
integrates divergent web services discovered 
through different descriptors. It is functionally 
very expensive and not significant towards end 
level solutions, and may lead to serious vulner-
able [46]. Migrating the failed execution into 
a best alternative execution of the composite 
service which has the same ability to reach a 
final state. Computing the number of invisibly 
compensated transitions is NP-complete. Run-
time unavailability of component services may 
result in composition failure. Menadjelia [38] 
has developed protocol-based automatic failure 
recovery to recover composite service unavail-
ability problem. The finite state machine has 
been used to model the approach.
5.2.4. Binding Fault
When service provider tries to bind the agree-
ment service in the system of service consumer 
from the service repository, there may happen 
various kinds of faults like mismatching faults, 
authentication, authorization and accounting 
faults. Signature mismatch faults, SLA faults, 
security-related faults are identified as binding 
faults. Mainly, there are two types of faults con-
sidered as binding faults. They are signature 
mismatch and SLA fault. 
If the signature assigned to service consumer 
does not match the signature of service repos-
itory, then there will be a signature mismatch 
problem. SLA fault is associated with the prob-
lem while making an agreement between ser-
vice broker or provider to the service consumer. 
Kandukuri et al. [31] have stated that customers 
participating in malicious or aggressive inter-
net activities do not guarantee for SLA claims 
and shall be in violation of the AUP (Accept-
able Use Policy). False or repetitive claims are 
also a violation of the terms of service and may 
be subject to service suspension. Whenever an 
SLA violation occurs to a service it can impact 
dependent services. Ismail et al. [33], [34] have 
proposed SLA violation handling approach us-
ing incremental time impact analysis. Their ap-
proach can efficiently recover and handle the 
violation in relation to the strategy of minimiz-
ing the number of service changes. It finds im-
pact region, existing impact region and expands 
the impact region, and increases the range if it 
does not cover the affected range.
5.2.5. Execution Fault
Failures of system on-time completion are 
caused by uncertain system performance. It is 
very difficult to find the location of the tem-
poral violation where exactly in a service. Luo 
et al. [37] have proposed temporal violation 
handling point selection strategy to deal with 
the temporal violation. They have adopted 
throughput consistency state verification and 
violation handling point selection. Transac-
tions have been evolving from flat transactions, 
transactions with save-points, nested trans-
actions, and more advanced ones, in order to 
give it more flexibility. Some transactions may 
be long-lived transactions that exploit the re-
sources and can hold locks on external objects 
for long periods of time due to the infinite ex-
ecution in the faulty situation. So, Balbastro 
et al. [19] have discussed transaction isolation 
fault and proposed a mechanism for handling 
exceptions in a synchronized way.
5.2.6. Service Delivery Fault
We have categorized service delivery fault as 
separate fault category because it is also an em-
phasized stage of the SBS. Many researchers 
have primarily been focused on service deliv-
ery fault. Balbastrol et al. [19] have developed 
CAA-DRIP framework as fault tolerant system 
to deal with latent errors and dormant faults and 
errors at service delivery in SOA. They have 
used simulation technique as repair assump-
tion. Timeout error is also very common and 
occurs in any distributed system. Yeung et al. 
[29] have proposed the formal approach to han-
dle timeout exception and message events. If 
an invocation cannot complete within the max-
imum duration allowed, the event handler will 
take over and halt the process. 
5.3. Non-functional Faults
At runtime, some services may become faulty 
and cause a process to disrupt its end-to-end 
quality of service (QoS) constraints. The faults 
identified in this category are also common 
with distributed system faults and SOA cy-
cle-specific faults, however, we have specified 
only non-functional and security-related faults 
in this category. If the system ensures the secu-
rity, then the SBS can be more dependable and 
reliable, which guarantees the overall quality of 
service. Thus, we have categorized security re-
lated faults into this class. Security fault, SLA 
(Service Level Agreement) and QoS are briefly 
explained as follows.
5.3.1. Security Fault
Security in SBS is important so as to ensure re-
liable operation and to protect the integrity of 
stored information. In case of authentication, 
authorization and accounting problem, secu-
rity fault may occur. Violation of security re-
quirements includes integrity, authentication, 
non-repudiation and confidential violations [3]. 
Confidential violations cause invalid service 
invocation and intruder may attack the system. 
Authentication ensures whether the service user 
is authenticated to bind the service. If the au-
thentication detail provided by the user is not 
valid, then there will be authentication fault. 
For security purpose, sensitive data should be 
in encrypted form, but there may be encryp-
tion fault and/or decryption fault to the service 
due to invalid request or design time fault. If 
the signature provided by the service user is in-
valid, then there will be a signature fault.
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difficult to model and prevent. Shwartz et al. 
[43] have noticed four human wrongs: request, 
time, configuration item and command wrongs. 
The user or the operator of the SBS may send 
the request with invalid input or logical error. In 
that case, the system cannot function properly. 
The user can send a request at an invalid time 
like ordering an item after a time-out. If the 
SBS system developer has not properly handled 
the exception of the system as many ways the 
system can be configured then the system may 
produce the invalid configuration result. A very 
common mistake by the user is an invalid com-
mand resulting from syntactical or symmetrical 
error in the command. 
5.2. SOA Cycle-specific Faults
SOA cycle-specific faults apply to SOA only. 
Some distributed system faults are also com-
mon with SOA cycle-specific faults because 
SOA is also a distributed design paradigm. We 
have also adopted some aspects of the fault tax-
onomy of Brüning et al. [4]. We try to include 
some additional SOA cycle-specific faults in 
addition to Brüning et al. taxonomy. There are 
five steps of SOA cycle: publishing, discov-
ering, composition, binding and execution, as 
mentioned in Section 3. We have categorized 
SOA cycle-specific faults into five categories 
as described in the following subsections.
5.2.1. Publishing Fault
The fault which occurs in the publishing stage 
of SBS is called publishing fault. Logical faults 
and policy violations are noticed as publishing 
fault in our proposed fault taxonomy of SBS. 
Bartole et al. [26] have discussed fault regard-
ing prescribed policy violation. They have also 
proposed a history-based approach to analyzing 
whether prescribed policies are violated or not. 
Their approach deals with security-relevant ac-
tivities, for example, opening socket problem, a 
problem on reading and writing files, and prob-
lem on accessing critical memory regions etc.
5.2.2. Discovering Fault
Service unavailability fault has gained more at-
tention from the researchers. Ismail et al. [27] 
and Wang et al. [24] have presented mathemat-
ical model about the temporal unavailability of 
services. They have stated that a service can 
be unavailable for certain period of time due 
to its maintenance, or some services may be 
available for only a certain time, for example, 
railways ticket booking service, movie theatre 
ticket booking service. Temporal unavailability 
of service can be calculated by estimating exe-
cution time and end available time.
5.2.3. Composition Fault
Service composition process may fail at inter-
mediate state due to an incomplete description 
of goal service requirements or due to the fact 
that the user is unaware or uninformed of the 
functionality provided by the existing partic-
ipant services [44] [45]. For example: if the 
"Online Booking" service is lacking all other 
committed services such as "Item Availability 
Check" the service should be roll-backed. Ser-
vice composition is the most fault-prone ac-
tivity in SBS since the task of the composition 
integrates divergent web services discovered 
through different descriptors. It is functionally 
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level solutions, and may lead to serious vulner-
able [46]. Migrating the failed execution into 
a best alternative execution of the composite 
service which has the same ability to reach a 
final state. Computing the number of invisibly 
compensated transitions is NP-complete. Run-
time unavailability of component services may 
result in composition failure. Menadjelia [38] 
has developed protocol-based automatic failure 
recovery to recover composite service unavail-
ability problem. The finite state machine has 
been used to model the approach.
5.2.4. Binding Fault
When service provider tries to bind the agree-
ment service in the system of service consumer 
from the service repository, there may happen 
various kinds of faults like mismatching faults, 
authentication, authorization and accounting 
faults. Signature mismatch faults, SLA faults, 
security-related faults are identified as binding 
faults. Mainly, there are two types of faults con-
sidered as binding faults. They are signature 
mismatch and SLA fault. 
If the signature assigned to service consumer 
does not match the signature of service repos-
itory, then there will be a signature mismatch 
problem. SLA fault is associated with the prob-
lem while making an agreement between ser-
vice broker or provider to the service consumer. 
Kandukuri et al. [31] have stated that customers 
participating in malicious or aggressive inter-
net activities do not guarantee for SLA claims 
and shall be in violation of the AUP (Accept-
able Use Policy). False or repetitive claims are 
also a violation of the terms of service and may 
be subject to service suspension. Whenever an 
SLA violation occurs to a service it can impact 
dependent services. Ismail et al. [33], [34] have 
proposed SLA violation handling approach us-
ing incremental time impact analysis. Their ap-
proach can efficiently recover and handle the 
violation in relation to the strategy of minimiz-
ing the number of service changes. It finds im-
pact region, existing impact region and expands 
the impact region, and increases the range if it 
does not cover the affected range.
5.2.5. Execution Fault
Failures of system on-time completion are 
caused by uncertain system performance. It is 
very difficult to find the location of the tem-
poral violation where exactly in a service. Luo 
et al. [37] have proposed temporal violation 
handling point selection strategy to deal with 
the temporal violation. They have adopted 
throughput consistency state verification and 
violation handling point selection. Transac-
tions have been evolving from flat transactions, 
transactions with save-points, nested trans-
actions, and more advanced ones, in order to 
give it more flexibility. Some transactions may 
be long-lived transactions that exploit the re-
sources and can hold locks on external objects 
for long periods of time due to the infinite ex-
ecution in the faulty situation. So, Balbastro 
et al. [19] have discussed transaction isolation 
fault and proposed a mechanism for handling 
exceptions in a synchronized way.
5.2.6. Service Delivery Fault
We have categorized service delivery fault as 
separate fault category because it is also an em-
phasized stage of the SBS. Many researchers 
have primarily been focused on service deliv-
ery fault. Balbastrol et al. [19] have developed 
CAA-DRIP framework as fault tolerant system 
to deal with latent errors and dormant faults and 
errors at service delivery in SOA. They have 
used simulation technique as repair assump-
tion. Timeout error is also very common and 
occurs in any distributed system. Yeung et al. 
[29] have proposed the formal approach to han-
dle timeout exception and message events. If 
an invocation cannot complete within the max-
imum duration allowed, the event handler will 
take over and halt the process. 
5.3. Non-functional Faults
At runtime, some services may become faulty 
and cause a process to disrupt its end-to-end 
quality of service (QoS) constraints. The faults 
identified in this category are also common 
with distributed system faults and SOA cy-
cle-specific faults, however, we have specified 
only non-functional and security-related faults 
in this category. If the system ensures the secu-
rity, then the SBS can be more dependable and 
reliable, which guarantees the overall quality of 
service. Thus, we have categorized security re-
lated faults into this class. Security fault, SLA 
(Service Level Agreement) and QoS are briefly 
explained as follows.
5.3.1. Security Fault
Security in SBS is important so as to ensure re-
liable operation and to protect the integrity of 
stored information. In case of authentication, 
authorization and accounting problem, secu-
rity fault may occur. Violation of security re-
quirements includes integrity, authentication, 
non-repudiation and confidential violations [3]. 
Confidential violations cause invalid service 
invocation and intruder may attack the system. 
Authentication ensures whether the service user 
is authenticated to bind the service. If the au-
thentication detail provided by the user is not 
valid, then there will be authentication fault. 
For security purpose, sensitive data should be 
in encrypted form, but there may be encryp-
tion fault and/or decryption fault to the service 
due to invalid request or design time fault. If 
the signature provided by the service user is in-
valid, then there will be a signature fault.
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5.3.2. SLA Fault
SLA (Service Level Agreement) is a commit-
ment between the service provider and the 
service consumer confirming the minimum 
levels of service to be expected from a partic-
ular product. Whenever SLA violation occurs 
to a service it can impact dependent services. 
SLA fault is also noticed in binding because, 
while the service consumer is able to use the 
service as defined in SLA, there can be SLA 
fault. SLA claim fault, as defined by Kandukuri 
et al. [31], false and repetitive claims by service 
customers are also a violation of the terms of 
service and may be subject to service suspen-
sion. A customer participating in malicious or 
aggressive internet activities does not ensure 
for SLA claims and shall be in violation of the 
AUP (Acceptable Use Policy). There are some 
studies conducted on handling SLA violation in 
SBS as in [33].
5.3.3. QoS Not Satisfied
QoS (Quality of Service) is the measure of 
transmission quality and service availability 
of a network [47]. Service availability is a ma-
jor foundation element of QoS. The design of 
high availability of the network infrastructure 
ensures the QoS. Loss, delay, jitter, low band-
width etc. are the major parameters of network 
traffic that can increase the downtime of the 
SBS. Delay Variation (Jitter) between the end-
to-end services due to the unstable communi-
cation can generate the time-out fault [47]. A 
system is said to be reliable if every packet in 
the system experienced the bounded delay [48]. 
Due to a low bandwidth, message passing can 
take undesirably long time. QoS not satisfied is 
directly integrated with other faults.
In a network of services, failure of one service 
can cause the other dependent services failure. 
Lhaksmana et al. [36] have addressed cascad-
ing failure in the service network and provided 
cascading failure tolerance approach. By means 
of the cascading failure simulation they have 
found that scale-free topology shows better tol-
erance, the effect of network topology on toler-
ance is more significant at a lower degree of al-
ternative services. The inverse of the degree of 
alternative is increased as the number of nodes 
experiencing cascading failure increases. The 
number of nodes involved in cascading failure 
is estimated linear to the average number of re-
quired component services. Luo et al. [37] have 
proposed a temporal violation handling from 
throughput consistency state verification and 
selection of the violation handling point which 
is able to determine the location of temporal vi-
olation in service and workflow.
Matrix representation of proposed extended fault 
taxonomy is presented in Figure 5. It shows the 
interaction between SOA faults and dimensions 
where dimensions are adopted from Avizienis 
et al. [6]. There are eight dimensions included 
in our proposed fault taxonomy: development 
and operational, internal and external, hardware 
and software, and malicious and non-malicious, 
as shown in rows. Ɵ symbol indicates that there 
is an interaction between dimensions and the 
corresponding fault in the column. If there is no 
Ɵ symbol, then there is no interaction between 
dimensions and the fault. One fault can occur 
in several dimensions at a time. For example, 
crash fault can be the operational fault, and/or 
internal fault and/or hardware fault and/or ma-
licious fault. A fault taxonomy proposed in [9] 
also tried this in same way adopting dimensions 
from Avizienis [6] but their taxonomy has some 
limitations on overlapping. In their work, there 
is no overlapping on the dimensions of the same 
group like time-out fault can be hardware fault 
and software fault as well but their taxonomy is 
unaware of this.
6. Fault Recovery Strategies for 
SOA-based System
We have categorized fault recovery strategies 
of service-oriented computing into two major 
categories: local recovery strategies and global 
recovery strategies, as shown in Figure 6. Inter-
nal recovery concerns the interactions among 
parameters in a service. Forward recovery tech-
nique is related to the transactional behaviors of 
the messages as results all or nothing. Backward 
recovery is associated with faults occurring in 
situation where multiple services interact with 
each other. It applies any of the exception han-
dling strategies like ignore, wait, retry, recom-
pose, retryUntil etc. Backward recovery means 
rollback of the faulty service with the previous 
healthy version of the same service. Forward 
recovery is more optimized and has better per-
formance than backward recovery in service re-
composition and recreation. Forward recovery 
technique either ignores the fault service and 
goes forward to keep the rest of the system run-
ning with no harm or retries the faulty service 
again or substitutes the faulty service with the 
another service which would be sufficient to 
fulfill the task of the current faulty service. Four 
types of replication/repetition mechanisms [49] 
can be used for fault tolerance system: passive 
repetition, active repetition, N-version model, 
and return to back/check-point model. Brief 
explanations of local recovery strategies and 
global recovery strategies are as follows.
6.1. Local Recovery Strategies
Local recovery strategies try to fix the fault in 
the current state of error. After successful cor-
rection, the system tries to continue its normal 
execution from the same state. Ignore, notify, 
halt, terminate and redundancy are noticed as 
local recovery strategies which are also shown 
in Figure 6. 
 ● Ignore: Ignore strategy just ignores the 
identified faults that do not affect the whole 
system, and does not violate the goal. It is 
an effective action in case of performance 
utilization and reliable system if the fault 
is temporal.
 ● Replace: In case of service fault, replace 
action replaces the faulty service by an al-
ternative equivalent service with the same 
functioning. The replace action might call 
for compensation or rollback to recover.
 ● Retry: It retries the fault generating service 
repeatedly, till the maximum retry times 
have been exhausted. Web server is state-
less between transactions; it does not main-
tain important state from first and last. The 
requests being processed are effectively 
dropped. A client may or may not receive 
a response that completely relies upon the 
in-process requests. The re-issuing of the 
request can lead to further problems since 
the same request may then be executed 
multiple times.
 ● Reboot: Shorting down the system and 
re-executing from the beginning to reduce 
the unstable state problem in the same en-
vironment increases the cost. It is a time-
consuming process to reboot the whole 
system so Candea et al. [50] have proposed 
Microreboot as a technique to increase the 
overall performance of the fault recovery 
rather than whole system reboot. Rather 
than rebooting the whole system Microre-
boot just reboots the particular module.Figure 5. Matrix representation of the proposed extended fault taxonomy.
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5.3.2. SLA Fault
SLA (Service Level Agreement) is a commit-
ment between the service provider and the 
service consumer confirming the minimum 
levels of service to be expected from a partic-
ular product. Whenever SLA violation occurs 
to a service it can impact dependent services. 
SLA fault is also noticed in binding because, 
while the service consumer is able to use the 
service as defined in SLA, there can be SLA 
fault. SLA claim fault, as defined by Kandukuri 
et al. [31], false and repetitive claims by service 
customers are also a violation of the terms of 
service and may be subject to service suspen-
sion. A customer participating in malicious or 
aggressive internet activities does not ensure 
for SLA claims and shall be in violation of the 
AUP (Acceptable Use Policy). There are some 
studies conducted on handling SLA violation in 
SBS as in [33].
5.3.3. QoS Not Satisfied
QoS (Quality of Service) is the measure of 
transmission quality and service availability 
of a network [47]. Service availability is a ma-
jor foundation element of QoS. The design of 
high availability of the network infrastructure 
ensures the QoS. Loss, delay, jitter, low band-
width etc. are the major parameters of network 
traffic that can increase the downtime of the 
SBS. Delay Variation (Jitter) between the end-
to-end services due to the unstable communi-
cation can generate the time-out fault [47]. A 
system is said to be reliable if every packet in 
the system experienced the bounded delay [48]. 
Due to a low bandwidth, message passing can 
take undesirably long time. QoS not satisfied is 
directly integrated with other faults.
In a network of services, failure of one service 
can cause the other dependent services failure. 
Lhaksmana et al. [36] have addressed cascad-
ing failure in the service network and provided 
cascading failure tolerance approach. By means 
of the cascading failure simulation they have 
found that scale-free topology shows better tol-
erance, the effect of network topology on toler-
ance is more significant at a lower degree of al-
ternative services. The inverse of the degree of 
alternative is increased as the number of nodes 
experiencing cascading failure increases. The 
number of nodes involved in cascading failure 
is estimated linear to the average number of re-
quired component services. Luo et al. [37] have 
proposed a temporal violation handling from 
throughput consistency state verification and 
selection of the violation handling point which 
is able to determine the location of temporal vi-
olation in service and workflow.
Matrix representation of proposed extended fault 
taxonomy is presented in Figure 5. It shows the 
interaction between SOA faults and dimensions 
where dimensions are adopted from Avizienis 
et al. [6]. There are eight dimensions included 
in our proposed fault taxonomy: development 
and operational, internal and external, hardware 
and software, and malicious and non-malicious, 
as shown in rows. Ɵ symbol indicates that there 
is an interaction between dimensions and the 
corresponding fault in the column. If there is no 
Ɵ symbol, then there is no interaction between 
dimensions and the fault. One fault can occur 
in several dimensions at a time. For example, 
crash fault can be the operational fault, and/or 
internal fault and/or hardware fault and/or ma-
licious fault. A fault taxonomy proposed in [9] 
also tried this in same way adopting dimensions 
from Avizienis [6] but their taxonomy has some 
limitations on overlapping. In their work, there 
is no overlapping on the dimensions of the same 
group like time-out fault can be hardware fault 
and software fault as well but their taxonomy is 
unaware of this.
6. Fault Recovery Strategies for 
SOA-based System
We have categorized fault recovery strategies 
of service-oriented computing into two major 
categories: local recovery strategies and global 
recovery strategies, as shown in Figure 6. Inter-
nal recovery concerns the interactions among 
parameters in a service. Forward recovery tech-
nique is related to the transactional behaviors of 
the messages as results all or nothing. Backward 
recovery is associated with faults occurring in 
situation where multiple services interact with 
each other. It applies any of the exception han-
dling strategies like ignore, wait, retry, recom-
pose, retryUntil etc. Backward recovery means 
rollback of the faulty service with the previous 
healthy version of the same service. Forward 
recovery is more optimized and has better per-
formance than backward recovery in service re-
composition and recreation. Forward recovery 
technique either ignores the fault service and 
goes forward to keep the rest of the system run-
ning with no harm or retries the faulty service 
again or substitutes the faulty service with the 
another service which would be sufficient to 
fulfill the task of the current faulty service. Four 
types of replication/repetition mechanisms [49] 
can be used for fault tolerance system: passive 
repetition, active repetition, N-version model, 
and return to back/check-point model. Brief 
explanations of local recovery strategies and 
global recovery strategies are as follows.
6.1. Local Recovery Strategies
Local recovery strategies try to fix the fault in 
the current state of error. After successful cor-
rection, the system tries to continue its normal 
execution from the same state. Ignore, notify, 
halt, terminate and redundancy are noticed as 
local recovery strategies which are also shown 
in Figure 6. 
 ● Ignore: Ignore strategy just ignores the 
identified faults that do not affect the whole 
system, and does not violate the goal. It is 
an effective action in case of performance 
utilization and reliable system if the fault 
is temporal.
 ● Replace: In case of service fault, replace 
action replaces the faulty service by an al-
ternative equivalent service with the same 
functioning. The replace action might call 
for compensation or rollback to recover.
 ● Retry: It retries the fault generating service 
repeatedly, till the maximum retry times 
have been exhausted. Web server is state-
less between transactions; it does not main-
tain important state from first and last. The 
requests being processed are effectively 
dropped. A client may or may not receive 
a response that completely relies upon the 
in-process requests. The re-issuing of the 
request can lead to further problems since 
the same request may then be executed 
multiple times.
 ● Reboot: Shorting down the system and 
re-executing from the beginning to reduce 
the unstable state problem in the same en-
vironment increases the cost. It is a time-
consuming process to reboot the whole 
system so Candea et al. [50] have proposed 
Microreboot as a technique to increase the 
overall performance of the fault recovery 
rather than whole system reboot. Rather 
than rebooting the whole system Microre-
boot just reboots the particular module.Figure 5. Matrix representation of the proposed extended fault taxonomy.
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 ● Recompose: This action searches for the 
alternative process with the same objec-
tive, discarding the current faulty process. 
It may be the last option while repairing 
the faulty service because it is the most 
time-consuming fault handling strategy. 
But this strategy is suitable for all fault 
handling recovery cases.
 ● Replication: Replicating the same service 
or process in several systems as a backup 
is a common approach to fault recovery. 
Fault service can be replaced by the same 
version of service from the backup sys-
tem. N-version programming can be used 
to implement replication. As identified 
by Mohamed [51], there are two types of 
replication: static replication and dynamic 
replication. In static replication, the num-
ber and position of the replica are fixed 
over time and do not change their behav-
ior during runtime. When a single replica 
becomes unresponsive, this replica is still 
considered a member of the replica com-
munication group. Dynamic replication 
adapts to a dynamic flexibility with the 
number of online replicas, their physical lo-
cations and selection of active replica dur-
ing runtime [51]. Replication technique, as 
a pre-emptive strategy to reduce the SBS 
fault, has some drawbacks. It increases the 
time complexity and space complexity to 
maintain the replicas for every request of 
the client. Also it needs request synchroni-
zation between servers to be deterministic.
6.2. Global Recovery Strategies
Logging, transactional, checkpointing, cache, 
crash-stop, hybrid strategies are considered 
as global recovery strategies. Figure 6 shows 
some of the popular global recovery strategies. 
These are briefly explained in the following 
subsections. 
 ● Logging: Logging mechanism stores inter-
cepted message traces of every transaction 
of service interactions. Later, if a fault oc-
curs, message traces can be used for fault 
repairing purpose. Its main concept is to 
redundantly store or log all the messages 
delivered to the primary server on stable 
storage or a replica.
 ● Transactional: Protocol design to do with 
service atomicity using transaction in-
tegrity concept is used in this strategy. In 
case of a fault, the current process returns 
to the stable state before executing the in-
teraction protocol which is known as skip 
processing strategy to accomplish the fault 
recovery. 
 ● Checkpointing: In the checkpointing ap-
proach, the server state is periodically 
copied, either to a standby server(s) or to 
a stable storage. There are basically two 
checkpointing approaches as mentioned 
by Ayari et al. [52]- incremental check-
pointing and time-line checkpointing. 
Incremental checkpointing tries to max-
imizing the consistency of the replicated 
states by performing checkpoints each 
time a critical state change occurs at the 
primary code. This approach increases 
the complexity. Another approach is time-
line based checkpointing where a state is 
checkpointed each period of time. Time-
to-checkpoint value depends on the mea-
sured failure frequency. 
 ● Cache: Possible state inconsistencies, 
compensated by state-caching and retry-
ing only failed interactions ensures the 
lower performance overhead on the scal-
able infrastructure. Wang et al. [24] firstly 
proposed cache-based process transfor-
mation using Petri nets to find the circular 
dependency. This strategy caches only the 
response message to achieve robust client/
server interaction, unlike backup or n-ver-
sion programming. 
 ● Crash-stop: SOA-based computing sys-
tems may fail permanently in an interre-
lated fashion at any random instant follow-
ing the so-called crash-stop failure model 
where tasks cannot be recovered from a 
failed server. If we leave the system un-
controlled, then the bad situation may be 
worse and the amount of cost increases, so 
in this condition, it is better to stop the cur-
rent functioning of the system.
 ● Hybrid strategies: In order to establish 
more secure recovery, computing two or 
more strategies can be combined to re-
cover faulty situation in SBSs. Many re-
searchers have practiced hybrid strategies 
rather than optimizing a particular strategy. 
A hybrid technique with application-level 
logging and connection replication, named 
CORAL (A Client-Transparent Fault-tol-
erant) mechanism is proposed in [53]. 
CORAL recovers in-process requests and 
does not require deterministic servers, 
or changes to the clients. To achieve the 
fault tolerance goals, active replication of 
the servers may be used, where every cli-
ent request is processed by two (or more) 
server replicas. Logging of the request is 
an alternative, but two different replies for 
the same request may reach the client vio-
lating the requirement for transparent fault 
tolerance. Their approach has assumed that 
only one host at a time can be affected by 
the fault and the impact of the fault can be 
to either crash a process or crash or hang 
the entire host. Rollback and compensation 
are analogous to their usual definitions. 
7. Challenges on SBS Fault Handling
In this section, we highlight some challenges ob-
served in the literature. Some major challenges 
like security and interoperability have gained 
a lot of attention by the researchers, whereas 
others like interoperability, availability, per-
formance and scalability also require more at-
tention. Some fault handling approaches have 
been tested in laboratories, some are just simu-
lated, but when they come to real applications, 
any of the new challenges may arise. Wang 
et al. [24] have mentioned consistency and ro-
bustness of the service as a challenge. Ismail 
et al. [27] have mentioned maintainability as 
a challenge in fault handling if some services 
have to be suspended for a few reasons such 
as maintenance purposes, unlike 24/7 availabil-
ity of services. Some might be available only 
Figure 6. An effective summarization of fault recovery strategies.
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 ● Recompose: This action searches for the 
alternative process with the same objec-
tive, discarding the current faulty process. 
It may be the last option while repairing 
the faulty service because it is the most 
time-consuming fault handling strategy. 
But this strategy is suitable for all fault 
handling recovery cases.
 ● Replication: Replicating the same service 
or process in several systems as a backup 
is a common approach to fault recovery. 
Fault service can be replaced by the same 
version of service from the backup sys-
tem. N-version programming can be used 
to implement replication. As identified 
by Mohamed [51], there are two types of 
replication: static replication and dynamic 
replication. In static replication, the num-
ber and position of the replica are fixed 
over time and do not change their behav-
ior during runtime. When a single replica 
becomes unresponsive, this replica is still 
considered a member of the replica com-
munication group. Dynamic replication 
adapts to a dynamic flexibility with the 
number of online replicas, their physical lo-
cations and selection of active replica dur-
ing runtime [51]. Replication technique, as 
a pre-emptive strategy to reduce the SBS 
fault, has some drawbacks. It increases the 
time complexity and space complexity to 
maintain the replicas for every request of 
the client. Also it needs request synchroni-
zation between servers to be deterministic.
6.2. Global Recovery Strategies
Logging, transactional, checkpointing, cache, 
crash-stop, hybrid strategies are considered 
as global recovery strategies. Figure 6 shows 
some of the popular global recovery strategies. 
These are briefly explained in the following 
subsections. 
 ● Logging: Logging mechanism stores inter-
cepted message traces of every transaction 
of service interactions. Later, if a fault oc-
curs, message traces can be used for fault 
repairing purpose. Its main concept is to 
redundantly store or log all the messages 
delivered to the primary server on stable 
storage or a replica.
 ● Transactional: Protocol design to do with 
service atomicity using transaction in-
tegrity concept is used in this strategy. In 
case of a fault, the current process returns 
to the stable state before executing the in-
teraction protocol which is known as skip 
processing strategy to accomplish the fault 
recovery. 
 ● Checkpointing: In the checkpointing ap-
proach, the server state is periodically 
copied, either to a standby server(s) or to 
a stable storage. There are basically two 
checkpointing approaches as mentioned 
by Ayari et al. [52]- incremental check-
pointing and time-line checkpointing. 
Incremental checkpointing tries to max-
imizing the consistency of the replicated 
states by performing checkpoints each 
time a critical state change occurs at the 
primary code. This approach increases 
the complexity. Another approach is time-
line based checkpointing where a state is 
checkpointed each period of time. Time-
to-checkpoint value depends on the mea-
sured failure frequency. 
 ● Cache: Possible state inconsistencies, 
compensated by state-caching and retry-
ing only failed interactions ensures the 
lower performance overhead on the scal-
able infrastructure. Wang et al. [24] firstly 
proposed cache-based process transfor-
mation using Petri nets to find the circular 
dependency. This strategy caches only the 
response message to achieve robust client/
server interaction, unlike backup or n-ver-
sion programming. 
 ● Crash-stop: SOA-based computing sys-
tems may fail permanently in an interre-
lated fashion at any random instant follow-
ing the so-called crash-stop failure model 
where tasks cannot be recovered from a 
failed server. If we leave the system un-
controlled, then the bad situation may be 
worse and the amount of cost increases, so 
in this condition, it is better to stop the cur-
rent functioning of the system.
 ● Hybrid strategies: In order to establish 
more secure recovery, computing two or 
more strategies can be combined to re-
cover faulty situation in SBSs. Many re-
searchers have practiced hybrid strategies 
rather than optimizing a particular strategy. 
A hybrid technique with application-level 
logging and connection replication, named 
CORAL (A Client-Transparent Fault-tol-
erant) mechanism is proposed in [53]. 
CORAL recovers in-process requests and 
does not require deterministic servers, 
or changes to the clients. To achieve the 
fault tolerance goals, active replication of 
the servers may be used, where every cli-
ent request is processed by two (or more) 
server replicas. Logging of the request is 
an alternative, but two different replies for 
the same request may reach the client vio-
lating the requirement for transparent fault 
tolerance. Their approach has assumed that 
only one host at a time can be affected by 
the fault and the impact of the fault can be 
to either crash a process or crash or hang 
the entire host. Rollback and compensation 
are analogous to their usual definitions. 
7. Challenges on SBS Fault Handling
In this section, we highlight some challenges ob-
served in the literature. Some major challenges 
like security and interoperability have gained 
a lot of attention by the researchers, whereas 
others like interoperability, availability, per-
formance and scalability also require more at-
tention. Some fault handling approaches have 
been tested in laboratories, some are just simu-
lated, but when they come to real applications, 
any of the new challenges may arise. Wang 
et al. [24] have mentioned consistency and ro-
bustness of the service as a challenge. Ismail 
et al. [27] have mentioned maintainability as 
a challenge in fault handling if some services 
have to be suspended for a few reasons such 
as maintenance purposes, unlike 24/7 availabil-
ity of services. Some might be available only 
Figure 6. An effective summarization of fault recovery strategies.
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during certain operating hours. In our previous 
work[54], from the literature review on the ba-
sis of distributions of papers in fault handling of 
SBS, we observed performance and reliability 
as major challenges in fault handling which is 
as shown in Figure 7.
Dynamicity and adaptiveness limit the ability 
of the tester to determine the WSs, that are in-
voked during the execution of a workflow [28], 
[35], [55]. The adaptable system can adjust to 
other environments at the real time. The ser-
vice-oriented system is also adaptable system. 
Thus, it is expensive, time-consuming and re-
source-consuming to detect and correct fault in 
different environments. 
Interoperability is the key challenge [56], [57]. 
In SBS, interoperability always gets high con-
cern as a challenge. Interoperability becomes a 
challenge as it needs to handle a large number 
of heterogeneous services that may belong to 
different, diversified platforms. Some research 
models or projects have been found in the lit-
erature review like WSRel, WSCol [58]. They 
have explored the challenges and drawbacks 
of the SOA and provided the appropriate strat-
egies for fault handling. White-box testing is 
also a challenge for SBS fault handling, due to 
its inclusion of specific instructions, concur-
rency, fault compensation and dynamic service 
discovery and invocation [59]. Service devel-
opers and service providers are responsible 
stakeholders to consider this interoperability 
issue to ensure the proper delivery of services 
to all service customers, no matter on what 
the hardware/software specifications are. The 
following paragraphs give a brief discussion 
about key challenges on fault handling of SBSs 
facedin detection and development of faults of 
SOA and identify reasons and models/projects 
proposed by the researchers. 
In general, reliability is the probability that a 
system functions correctly for a given time pe-
riod. Overall system reliability increases with 
service redundancy that increases the rate of 
service delivery to the customer. Reliability of 
services is related to security and service avail-
ability. Infrastructures like software, hardware 
and network channel should be trustworthy 
to enrich reliability throughout all the layers 
of SOA. Unreliable communication may lead 
to system failures, data loss, and long delays. 
Several researchers in the studies [60] [61] [62] 
[63] have proposed reliability checking models 
Figure 7. Challenges on SBS fault handling.
to achieve service compositions. A paper [60] 
has concentrated on reliability issue of SBS and 
proposed a framework and prototype tool for 
detecting anomalous services in Open Service 
Gateway Initiation(OSGi)-based applications. 
Anomalous services decrease the reliability. 
Evaluating reliability is not an easy task be-
cause different vendors are usually black-box 
components which lack source code and design 
documents which makes it difficult to evaluate 
their quality by static code analysis. 
Scalability is another challenge in handling 
faults for SBS. The scalability of the SBS means 
the ability to add new services, components and 
functions for service consumers, without nega-
tively affecting the quality of existing services. 
Increasing the functionality is always a difficult 
task in case of heterogeneous SBS platforms 
and communication protocols, for example, 
vertical service delivery. SBSs must provide 
scalable mechanisms for registration, discovery 
of service faults as well as service interoper-
ability.
Availability of service means the ability of 
SBSs to provide services to service customers 
anywhere and anytime. Several solutions [62] 
[64] [51] to achieve high availability of SOA 
services are to providing redundancy for ser-
vices, logging, and replacement. Service avail-
ability means availability of service for service 
customer all the time. Some tools [63][65][66] 
can help system to maximize the service avail-
ability. Infrastructure availability means 24/7 
hardware and software availability of SBS. 
Due to heterogeneous systems [67], it is not 
easy to ensure security and privacy of users. So 
security is a significant challenge [25] for the 
SBS fault handling. Lack of common standard 
and architecture creates a problem in providing 
security. One approach could be access control 
on the application layer of SOA. 
Mobility is another challenge for SBS realiza-
tion because most of the services are expected 
to be delivered to mobile users. Mobile users 
[67] can move from one place to another, which 
may lead to temporary unavailability of service 
due to the devices transfer from a gateway to 
another gateway. For example, Internet of Ve-
hicles [67], Ad-hoc etc. 
Observability analyses the SBS dynamics and 
determines if the technology under consider-
ation requires extension or enhancements to 
build scalable resource management solution 
[68]. Observability addresses how fine-grained 
the state of a system and its components can be 
observed from the outside.
Autonomy: services are autonomous means ser-
vices exercise a high level of control over their 
underlying runtime execution environment. 
Service autonomy increases a service's runtime 
reliability, performance and predictability, es-
pecially when being reused and composed [69]. 
A high level of control over how service logic 
is designed and developed at implementation 
level is required. 
8. Conclusion
Since SOA (Service Oriented Architecture) is 
a black-box in nature, the fault can be detected 
only when it really executes. We proposed an 
extended fault taxonomy that systematically 
presents a brief description of possible faults in 
SBS. The taxonomy also shows the interaction 
among different faults, how a fault can cause 
other ones. It divides the faults into three cat-
egories: SOA life cycle-specific faults, distrib-
uted system faults and non-functional faults. 
The knowledge of fault taxonomy of SBS and 
its associated challenges is essential for devel-
oping and testing fault-tolerant and dependable 
systems. Practitioners and researchers can ob-
tain a general understanding of SBS depend-
ability. To enhance the dependability of SBS, 
fault recovery techniques should also be con-
sidered inherently. Possible fault recovery strat-
egies are also presented in the paper. For further 
work, we have a plan to extend our fault taxon-
omy to include possible faults in cloud comput-
ing and Internet of things.
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[35], [55]. The adaptable system can adjust to 
other environments at the real time. The ser-
vice-oriented system is also adaptable system. 
Thus, it is expensive, time-consuming and re-
source-consuming to detect and correct fault in 
different environments. 
Interoperability is the key challenge [56], [57]. 
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cern as a challenge. Interoperability becomes a 
challenge as it needs to handle a large number 
of heterogeneous services that may belong to 
different, diversified platforms. Some research 
models or projects have been found in the lit-
erature review like WSRel, WSCol [58]. They 
have explored the challenges and drawbacks 
of the SOA and provided the appropriate strat-
egies for fault handling. White-box testing is 
also a challenge for SBS fault handling, due to 
its inclusion of specific instructions, concur-
rency, fault compensation and dynamic service 
discovery and invocation [59]. Service devel-
opers and service providers are responsible 
stakeholders to consider this interoperability 
issue to ensure the proper delivery of services 
to all service customers, no matter on what 
the hardware/software specifications are. The 
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to achieve service compositions. A paper [60] 
has concentrated on reliability issue of SBS and 
proposed a framework and prototype tool for 
detecting anomalous services in Open Service 
Gateway Initiation(OSGi)-based applications. 
Anomalous services decrease the reliability. 
Evaluating reliability is not an easy task be-
cause different vendors are usually black-box 
components which lack source code and design 
documents which makes it difficult to evaluate 
their quality by static code analysis. 
Scalability is another challenge in handling 
faults for SBS. The scalability of the SBS means 
the ability to add new services, components and 
functions for service consumers, without nega-
tively affecting the quality of existing services. 
Increasing the functionality is always a difficult 
task in case of heterogeneous SBS platforms 
and communication protocols, for example, 
vertical service delivery. SBSs must provide 
scalable mechanisms for registration, discovery 
of service faults as well as service interoper-
ability.
Availability of service means the ability of 
SBSs to provide services to service customers 
anywhere and anytime. Several solutions [62] 
[64] [51] to achieve high availability of SOA 
services are to providing redundancy for ser-
vices, logging, and replacement. Service avail-
ability means availability of service for service 
customer all the time. Some tools [63][65][66] 
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ability. Infrastructure availability means 24/7 
hardware and software availability of SBS. 
Due to heterogeneous systems [67], it is not 
easy to ensure security and privacy of users. So 
security is a significant challenge [25] for the 
SBS fault handling. Lack of common standard 
and architecture creates a problem in providing 
security. One approach could be access control 
on the application layer of SOA. 
Mobility is another challenge for SBS realiza-
tion because most of the services are expected 
to be delivered to mobile users. Mobile users 
[67] can move from one place to another, which 
may lead to temporary unavailability of service 
due to the devices transfer from a gateway to 
another gateway. For example, Internet of Ve-
hicles [67], Ad-hoc etc. 
Observability analyses the SBS dynamics and 
determines if the technology under consider-
ation requires extension or enhancements to 
build scalable resource management solution 
[68]. Observability addresses how fine-grained 
the state of a system and its components can be 
observed from the outside.
Autonomy: services are autonomous means ser-
vices exercise a high level of control over their 
underlying runtime execution environment. 
Service autonomy increases a service's runtime 
reliability, performance and predictability, es-
pecially when being reused and composed [69]. 
A high level of control over how service logic 
is designed and developed at implementation 
level is required. 
8. Conclusion
Since SOA (Service Oriented Architecture) is 
a black-box in nature, the fault can be detected 
only when it really executes. We proposed an 
extended fault taxonomy that systematically 
presents a brief description of possible faults in 
SBS. The taxonomy also shows the interaction 
among different faults, how a fault can cause 
other ones. It divides the faults into three cat-
egories: SOA life cycle-specific faults, distrib-
uted system faults and non-functional faults. 
The knowledge of fault taxonomy of SBS and 
its associated challenges is essential for devel-
oping and testing fault-tolerant and dependable 
systems. Practitioners and researchers can ob-
tain a general understanding of SBS depend-
ability. To enhance the dependability of SBS, 
fault recovery techniques should also be con-
sidered inherently. Possible fault recovery strat-
egies are also presented in the paper. For further 
work, we have a plan to extend our fault taxon-
omy to include possible faults in cloud comput-
ing and Internet of things.
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